Abstract. I develop in depth the machinery of (L, n)-models originally introduced by Shelah [5] and, independently in a slightly different form by Kripke (cf [3], [4] ). This machinery allows fairly routine constructions of true but unprovable sentences in PA. I give three applications: 1. Shelah's alternative proof of the Paris-Harrington theorem, 2. The independence over PA of a Π 
Introduction
In [5] (L, n)-models are used by Shelah explicitly to reprove the Paris-Harrington Theorem and a similar idea is used implicitly to give an example of a true but unprovable Π 0 1 -sentence. In fact, the method Shelah employs turns out to be very flexible. The goal of this work is to show how (L, n)-models can be used to routinely construct finitary Ramsey theoretic statements, even Π 0 1 ones, which can be shown to be true in the standard model but are not provable in PA.
In this article, I develop the the machinery of (L, n)-models, beginning with the definitions and lemmata of [5] , though often using slightly strengthened forms. This is the content of the section following this one. After setting the scene, three applications are given (sections 3, 4, and 5 below respectively). First I work through Shelah's proof of the Paris-Harrington Theorem. Second, I give a new example of a true but unprovable Π 0 1 -statement. Finally, I show the PA-independence of a two finite choice like principles, the second of which is similar to the one Shelah showed was independent in [5] (Claim 3.4 of that paper). My hope is that the reader, having seen three applications back to back, should start to see how one can apply the ideas to a wide variety of contexts. The final section ends with a discussion and some open questions.
Let me finish this introduction with a word about the history of the ideas discussed here. In his article, Shelah states that he was motivated by a question of Harrington as to whether the success of the Paris-Harrington theorem could be reproduced with a Π 0 1 -statement. While he briefly mentions the article in his reflection [6] , it does 2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. 03C62, 03C98, 05D10. This reasearch was supported by a CUNY mathematics fellowship and the author would like to thank the mathematics department at the Graduate Center at CUNY for this. not seem he ever pursued the ideas further in any published work. Independently a similar idea was also discovered by Kripke under the name "fulfillment" (here we use this word for the relation |= * , inspired by Kripke). Kripke's work remains (to the best of my knowledge) unpublished though several other authors have written on it, for example [4] and [3] . As far as I know the only other place a version of (L, n)-modelsà la Shelah has appeared is in the beautiful article [7] by Wilkie, there to provide a very different type of application. What I call (L, n)-models in this article are called "approximating structures" by Wilkie. My terminology throughout this text is mostly standard, conforming, for example, to that of [1] . That book also may be consulted for any undefined concepts in the theory of models of PA.
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Partial L Structures and (L, n)-models
Throughout let's fix a finite signature first order language L. Later on L will be assumed to extend the language of PA, which I denote L PA , by (at most) finitely many predicate symbols (and always including the symbol < for order), however the basic definitions below do not depend on this. Unless otherwise stated, we always argue in PA (and not ZFC). Thus, for example if we write that a set (sequence, etc) is finite, we allow that it could be possibly of nonstandard size.
is a set, every constant symbol c in the signature of L is interpreted as some member c M ∈ M, every relation symbol R with arity n in the signature of L is interpreted as a relation of the appropriate arity R M ⊆ M n and the function symbols are interpreted as (potentially) partial functions of the appropriate arity on M. In other words, M is an L-structure with partial functions as opposed to total ones.
If f is a function andā ∈ M ln(ā) is such that f (ā) is not defined, I let f (ā) be not a well defined term and any sentence involving it is not a well formed formula. Allowing for this caveat the usual recursive model-theoretic definition of satisfaction M |= ϕ can be defined as usual.
There is a key example of a partial structure I will return to often.
Example 2.2 (Key Example)
. Let L extend L PA and let n be a (possibly nonstandard) natural number. Define M n to be the structure with universe n = {0, 1, ..., n − 1} and ≤, +, × etc defined as normal but restricted to this set. For instance M 6 |= 1 + 1 = 2 but the term "3 × 4" is treated as syntactic nonsense.
Many of the standard notions from basic model theory can be developed in the context of partial models. In particular, one can define isomorphism of structures in the natural way. Also, one could instead work with relational signatures and use relations representing the graphs of the partial functions though I view the use of functions symbols as enlightening in applications. Also, they provide more natural definitions when we choose to tweak basic notions from model thoery for our context. The definition of substructure, given below, is the first such example. Definition 2.3 (Substructure). Given two partial L structures M and N , say that M is a substructure of N if it is a substructure in the usual sense and for all tuples a 0 , ..., a n−1 ∈ M and all n-ary function symbols f we have that f N (a 0 , ..., a n−1 ) is defined. In this case I write M ⊆ N .
If a partial L-structure M happens to interpret all functions symbols as total then I call structure total. Note that by the definition of the substructure relation M ⊆ M if and only if it is total. In particular, non-total structures are not substructures of themselves 1 . Continuing the key example from above and assuming that +, × and the successor function are the only function symbols in L, it follows that if n > m 2 then M m ⊆ M n since for all l, k < m, l × k, l + k < m 2 < n so these are all well defined terms in M n .
The following definition is the main character of the article.
Definition 2.4 ((L, n)-model).
Let n be a finite number. An (L, n)-model is a sequence A = A 0 , A 1 , ...A n−1 of length n so that for all i < n A i is a partial L-structure and for all i with i + 1 < n we have that A i ⊆ A i+1 . The point is that the (L, n)-models satisfy a kind of satisfaction relation called fulfillment which can be used to code consistency statements into finite combinatorial ones. Note that if A is an (L, n)-model then A is the top model and in particular is a partial L-structure.
From now on, given a formula ϕ, denote by dp(ϕ) the depth of ϕ i.e. the number of quantifiers when ϕ is in prenex normal form (NOT the number of quantifier alternations). Denote by |ϕ| the syntactic length of ϕ. Given an (L, n)-model A, I denote by
Definition 2.6 (Fulfillment). Let ϕ( x) be an L formula in prenex normal form, A an (L, n)-model from some n and a a tuple of elements of the same arity as x, all belonging to some A i for i + dp(ϕ) < n − 1 (so in particular, parameters are not in the top model) and so that i is least with every term t( x) appearing in ϕ is so that t( a) is defined in A i+1 . We define recursively what we mean by A |= * ϕ( a) (read as A fulfills ϕ( a)).
(1) If ϕ is atomic, then A |= * ϕ( a) if and only if A n−1 |= ϕ( a). 
* ϕ( a) if and only if for all j ∈ [i, n − dp(ψ)], and all b ∈ A j we have that A |= * ψ(b, a).
Let me make a few remarks. The intuition of the definition of |= * is as follows. An (L, n)-model A is an attempt to build an actual model with each element of the sequence a further step of the construction. At the n th stage we are asked to guess what will be true in the final structure of length ω. Guessing ϕ will be true is exactly the statement that A |= * ϕ. This is underlined by the restriction on the final case that we only look for witnesses appearing "early enough on" in the sequence of models since we can't yet make promises about what will happen with the elements of the top model.
From now on I fix L to extend L PA by finitely many relation symbols, but no new function symbols. In the rest of the article when I write "for all L..." it is implied that I am quantifying only over such languages. Notice that if M is a total L structure modeling (a sufficient fragment of) PA then, assuming all A i are finite, and n ∈ M the statement " A |= * ϕ( a)" is definable in the model. As an example of |= * and a lemma for a theorem to be proved later let's consider what is fulfilled by models of the form M m described above. It turns out these models fulfill a large fragment of PA. Since I will need to be careful about syntax, let me note explicitly the axioms of Robinson's arithmetic Q as follows:
Recall that PA can be recovered from Q by adding the induction or equivalently the least number principle schema. In the lemma below, if Γ is a set of sentences, I mean by A |= * Γ that for each ϕ ∈ Γ, A |= * ϕ.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose M m is a square increasing (L, n)-model of length at least 3 whose associated square increasing sequence is m. Then M m |= * Q. Also, M |= * "< is a linear order with no greatest element".
Proof. This is essentially a straightforward examination of the definitions though I sketch a proof for completeness. Note that all of the axioms have depth 1 or 2 hence n ≥ 3 is needed. Let's first prove that M m |= * ∀x 0 = S(x): Let a ∈ M j for j > 0. I need to show that M m |= * a = S(0) but since this later expression is atomic it suffices to see that M n−1 |= a = S(0) which is clearly true. A similar argument works for the remaining axioms. Note that by the choice of the m i 's the terms are always defined. For example, for the Axiom 6, if x, y ∈ M j then x × y + x ≤ (max{x, y})
2 ∈ M j+1 , as needed. Axiom 7 is similar as well, noting that we cannot choose y in the top model, hence we ensure that any chosen y will be either 0 or the successor of some x.
For the "also" part, it's not hard to see that ≤ is linear. What's surprising is that, even though the structures are finite and have a greatest element externally, this is not fulfilled by the sequence of models. Indeed notice, to say that < has no top element means formally that the following sentence is fulfilled: ∀x∃yx < y. This has depth 2. Thus, M m fulfulls this sentence if for every b ∈ M j , with j < n − 2 we have that M m |= * ∃yb < y. This latter sentence is fulfilled just in case there is a a ∈ M j+1 greater than b, but of course this is true since M j is a proper initial segment of M j+1 .
The utility of A |= * ϕ is described by the next few lemmas. I will say that ϕ has a model if there is a (total) L structure M so that M |= ϕ (in the normal sense) and that ϕ has an (L, n)-model if there is an (L, n)-model A so that A |= * ϕ. Note that by following the definition of |= * it's not hard to see that if ϕ has an (L, n)-model, say A, for n > dp(ϕ) then ϕ has an (L, m)-model for each m so that dp(ϕ) < m ≤ n namely
. The following lemma is perhaps the most important as it will be used to bound the complexity of statements we wish to prove are independent. In a weakened form it appeared as Claim 1.3 b) of [5] . In the lemma below, I assume A is finite so as to argue in PA, however if one formalizes the argument in ZFC instead A can be infinite. Moreover, I will assume that A has an external well order and use it implicitly, referring for example to "the least element of A so that...holds". Note that in PA one can assume this for free and in ZFC it follows from choice.
Lemma 2.8 (The Finite Model Lemma). Let m, n be natural numbers and ϕ be an L-sentence of depth at most m − 1 < n. Let |L| denote the cardinality of the signature of L and let j be the largest size of an arity of a function symbol. Given any (L, n)-model A, there is another (L, n)-model B so that the following hold:
(1) B 0 has cardinality at most |L| (2) B i+1 has cardinality at most 2 i m+1 
Moreover, given ϕ, L and A, the procedure for producing B is computable.
Roughly the lemma is a version of the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem with elementarity restricted to subformulae of ϕ. The bounds in the lemma are probably not best possible. What matters is that they are primitive recursive in i, |ϕ|, |L|, m and j. In particular they do not depend on n or A. Also the meat of the lemma is items 1 through 4. Item 5 is a technical condition that will be used in an application later. The lemma without the extra condition goes through just as well.
Proof. I will define by induction, for i < n models B i , so that B i ⊆ B i+1 , the domain of B i is contained in that of A i for each i and so that B i is of the appropriate size. Then I will set B = B i | i < n and argue that for any subformula ψ of ϕ, B |= * ψ if and only if A |= * ψ and that condition 5 holds. It will be clear from the construction that this procedure can be carried out recursively, given knowledge of A, L and ϕ. thus we get the bound in the statement of the lemma.
By construction we have dealt with condition 5 so it remains to see that B |= * ψ if and only if A |= * ψ for each subformula ψ with parameters in B i (say). This is by induction on ψ. If ψ is atomic, then B |= * ψ if and only if B n−1 |= ψ by definition. Moreover, note that B n−1 is a substructure of A n−1 in the normal sense (not necessarily closed under function sumbols) and therefore B n−1 |= ψ if and only if A n−1 |= ψ since ψ is atomic. Finally noting that by definition A n−1 |= ψ if and only if A |= * ψ finishes the atomic case. By induction, the boolean cases are immediate, so we focus on the quantifier cases. If ψ is of the form ∃yψ ′ (y) then by our construction, there is a witness in B if and only if there is a witness in A so this case is taken care of. Finally if ψ is of the form ∀yψ ′ (y) then if A |= * ∀yψ ′ (y) then for each a ∈ A [i+1,n−dp(ψ)] and hence each a ∈ B [i+1,n−dp(ψ)] A |= * ψ ′ (a) and so by the inductive hypothesis B |= * ψ ′ (a) which means B |= * ∀yψ ′ (y). Conversely, if A |= ¬∀yψ ′ (y) then there is a witness in A [i+1,n−dp(ψ)] and the least such witness was put into B during the construction so the converse holds as well.
Since
To push this idea further, let me introduce a notion of isomorphism for (L, n)-models.
Definition 2.9. Let A and B be two (L, n)-models. We say that A and B are isomorphic, denoted A ∼ = B if there is a bijection g : A → B so that for any i < n g ↾ A i bijects onto B i and is an isomorphism of partial L-structures. Proposition 2.10. If A is a square increasing sequence and B ∼ = A then there is a unique isomorphism from A to B. Consequently, A is rigid and if C ∼ = B then there is a unique isomorphism from C to B.
Proof. First recall that A is an initial segment of natural numbers. Now suppose that B ∼ = A and, towards a contradiction, let a ∈ A be the least so that there are b 1 , b 2 ∈ B distinct with isomorphisms g 1 , g 2 : A ∼ = B with g 1 (a) = b 1 and g 2 (a) = b 2 . Note that a can't be 0 since this must be sent to the least element of B. But then
For the second part, note that it follows by uniqueness that the only automorphism of A is the identity and if g 1 : A ∼ = B and g 2 : A ∼ = C are the unique isomorphisms, then the only possible isomorphism from B to C is g
Now, using the finite model lemma, if ϕ has an (L, n)-model A which is linearly ordered by <, then it has one whose domain is a finite initial segment of the natural numbers via the isomorphism induced by the unique order preserving bijection between the domain of the model B obtained by the computable procedure described in the finite model lemma and the initial segment is of length |B n−1 | < Col(n − 1, |ϕ|, k, |L|, n). Such a structure is called the F-collapse of A for ϕ (F for fulfillment).
Next I prove a kind of completeness theorem for |= * . In ZFC this is easily accomplished.
Lemma 2.11. (ZFC) Let ϕ be an L-sentence. Then ϕ has a model if and only if it has a (L, n)-model for all n > dp(ϕ).
Proof. The forward direction is obvious. If M is total and M |= ϕ then it's rudimentary to check that, if we let A be the (L, n)-model so that for all k < n A n = M then A |= * ϕ. For the backward direction, suppose that for all n > dp(ϕ), the sentence ϕ has a (L, n)-model. By the finite model lemma we can assume more over that for each n the witnessing (L, n)-model is finite. Thus, up to isomorphism, we can assume that the model's universe is some initial sequence of natural numbers. Let T be the collection of all such (L, n)-models ordered by end extension: A ≤ end B just in case A is an (L, m)-model and B is an (L, n)-model for n ≥ m and for all k < m A k = B k . Note that (T, ≤ end ) is a finite branching, infinite tree. Thus it has a branch, A(n) | n < ω . Let M = n<ω A(n). This is a total model of ϕ, as required.
In PA, we need to be more careful. I will work on the level of proofs. Fix a proof system formalizable in PA. It's not hard to see that the following arguments work for any reasonable such choice. Proof. Let M |= PA be a model of PA in which ϕ has no proof. By the arithmetized completeness theorem in M there is a formula ψ defining a model of ¬ϕ. But then, we can define in M a formula defining the (L, n)-model consisting of the model defined by ψ repeated n times. Finally using the F-collapse of this sequence for ¬ϕ we obtain an (L, n)-model of ¬ϕ coded by an element of M. Thus M |= ∃x(x codes an (L, n)−model of ¬ϕ). Since M was arbitrary we obtain that PA proves that if ϕ is not provable then there is an x coding an (L, n)-model for all sufficiently large n (for n > dp(ϕ)), from which the the lemma follows.
Next I show that if there is a proof of ϕ then all (L, n)-models fulfill ϕ for all sufficiently large n. Lemma 2.13. (PA) If ϕ is an L-sentence so that ⊢ ϕ, then every (L, n)-model fulfills ϕ for all sufficiently large n.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the length of proof of ϕ. This is essentially the proof of the soundness theorem, noting that any reasonable proof system will respect fulfilment. For instance, if ϕ := ∃yψ(y) and the last rule of the proof is ∃ introduction then that means that there is a term t so that ψ(t) is provable and inductively, every (L, n) model A for n sufficiently large must fulfill ψ(t) so A 1 must define t and therefore A |= * ∃yψ(y). The other rules can be dealt with similarly.
Putting together the proofs of Lemmas 2.12 and 2.13 we obtain:
Theorem 2.14 (The Completeness Theorem for Fulfillment). (PA) An L sentence ϕ is provable if and only if for all sufficiently large n, all (L, n)-models fulfill ϕ.
As a consequence we get an important result that will be used later.
Corollary 2.15. (PA)
The statement "For all sufficiently large n and all finite subsets Γ ⊆ PA Γ has an (L, n)-model" is equivalent to con(PA).
Proof. Working internally in M, if M |= ¬con(PA) then M must have a finite subset Γ ⊆ PA so that Γ ⊢ 0 = 1 and thus ⊢ ¬ Γ. But then by Lemma 2.14 it must be the case that all (L, n)-models for n large enough fulfill ¬ Γ.
Theorem 2.15 is used as follows. We want to show that various sentences are not provable in PA, thus we will show that, assuming such sentences, one can prove that for all sufficiently large n and all finite subsets Γ ⊆ PA Γ has an (L, n)-model and hence con(PA). The first example of such an argument is an alternative proof of the Paris-Harrington Theorem.
A New Proof of the Paris-Harrington Theorem
In this section, I use the machinery of (L, n)-models to reprove the Paris-Harrington Theorem from [2] . Recall that the Paris-Harrington Principle, PH states that for all e, k, r there is a M so that every partition P : [M] e → r there is a H ⊆ M which is homogenous, of size at least k and so that the cardinality of H is larger than the minimal element. As it will be a useful template for later, let me recall briefly the proof that PH is true in the standard model of PA. Proof. Suppose not and fix an e, k, r so that the principle fails. Let T be the collection of partitions of P : [M] e → r so that there is no H ⊆ M which is homogenous, of size k and so that the cardinality of H is larger than the minimal element. By our assumption there is such a P for each M. Order T by P ⊑ Q if P is a partition on M and Q is a partition on M ′ > M and Q ↾ [M] e = P . Then T is an infinite, finitely branching tree so by König's lemma it has a branch, B ⊆ T . Note, however, that B : [ω] e → r is a partition of ω. Therefore by the infinite Ramsey theorem there is an infinite C ⊆ B so that B ↾ [C] e is constant. Pick M < ω so that C ∩ M has size k and cardinality larger than its minimal element. Since C is infinite this is easily arranged: let M be larger than the first k + min(C) elements. But then
e is constant, contradicting our assumption. Now, define the theory PA P F k to be the axioms of Q plus the first k instances of parameter free least number principle: LNP (ϕ) := ∃xϕ(x) → ∃x∀y(ϕ(x) ∧ (ϕ(y) → x ≤ y)) where ϕ is one of the first k formulae relative to some primitive recursive ordering of the formulas of L. It's well known that PA is equivalent to {PA
Our goal is to show that PA + PH implies con(PA). In light of the results in the previous section, it suffices to show the following: ]). PH implies con(PA) and so, in particular, it is not provable in PA.
Towards proving Theorem 3.2 fix a model M |= PA + PH and work internally in M. Let M be the universe of M. Note that by the M-internalized version of Lemma 2.7 every square increasing (L, n)-model fulfills Q. Therefore, it suffices to show that we can always extend square increasing models to longer square increasing models fulfilling arbitrarily finitely many instances of the least number principle. I begin by showing how to get a square-increasing (L, n)-model of LNP (ϕ) for some fixed sentence ϕ.
Lemma 3.4. Let ϕ(x) be an L-formula. For all n > dp(ϕ) + 3 there is a square increasing (L, n)-model of LNP (ϕ).
Proof. Fix an n > dp(ϕ) + 3. If there is a square increasing model fulfilling ¬∃xϕ(x) then this model fulfills LNP (ϕ) so we're done, thus assume that every square increasing model fulfills ∃xϕ(x). Now fix a number m 0 large enough that all terms in ϕ are definable in M m 0 . By the way fulfillment was defined for ∃xϕ(x) if M m |= * ∃xϕ(x) with m 0 the first element of m then such an x can be found less than m 1 . This motivates defining for any square increasing sequence m = m 1 < ... < m n , F ϕ ( m) = min{x < m 1 | M m |= * ϕ(x)} with m 2 0 < m 1 . By the assumption F ϕ is always defined. Now for a square increasing sequence m 1 < ... < m n < m n+1 of length n + 1 let
This is a two coloring of n + 1-tuples. Let k >> n. Applying PH, let M be such that all F ′ ϕ has a homogenous subset H ⊆ M whose cardinality is at least k and larger than its minimal element. 
|=
* ϕ(y) ∧ y < x but that is a contradiction since in this case we actually have that y < x (in M) and by the previous claim, x was the least so that any n-tuple of elements from H fulfilled ϕ(x).
To prove Theorem 3.2 it suffices now to show that we can handle k many formulae at the same time. I indicate this below.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Fix now k formulae ϕ 0 , ..., ϕ k−1 and define
The proof of the theorem now goes through exactly the same as that of Lemma 3.4.
The Bounded Coloring Principle
In this section I use the ideas from the previous proof to provide an example of a true but unprovable Π . Let r be a natural number. A bounded coloring in r colors is a function F , with domain a collection of (L, n)-models (n fixed) and range r so that the domain is closed under isomorphism and the following two conditions hold.
(1) Isomorphism Invariance: If A ∼ = B then F (A) = F (B).
(2) Boundedness: For each k ≥ n and every ⊆-linearly ordered sequence of length k of partial structures A = A 0 , ..., A k−1 so that all of the sub ntuples are in the domain, there is a formula ϕ of length at most k so that A |= * ϕ and if B = B 0 , ..., B n−1 is the F-collapse of A then for any i 0 < i 1 < ... < i n−1 < k we have that F (A i 0 , ..., A i n−1 ) = F (B i 0 , ..., B i n−1 ). Such a function is said to be on N for some N < ω if the union of the universes of the models in its domain is contained in N. In this case we only require of course that the domain be closed under isomorphic copies whose universes are contained in N.
The Bounded Coloring Principle, denoted BCP is the statement that for all r, n, L, k if the largest arity of a function symbol in L is j and F is a bounded coloring on kCol(k, j, k, |L|, n) + 1 then there is a sequence H = A 0 ⊆ A 1 ⊆ ... ⊆ A k−1 of (L, n)-models so that any n-length subsequence is in the domain of F , |A 0 | < k and F is homogeneous on the collection of all subsequences of length n. For a fixed r, n, L, k and N let us denote the conclusion of BCP by BCP(r, n, L, k, N). Note that BCP = ∀r, n, L, kBCP(r, n, L, k, kCol(k, j, k, |L|, n) + 1) and so in particular it's Π 0 1 . I will show the following theorem. Theorem 4.2. The statement BCP is true in the standard model but PA + BCP implies con(PA). In particular, BCP is independent of PA.
The proof of this theorem is broken into several lemmata. I start by showing that the statement is equivalent to the seemingly weaker, Π 0 2 statement with the primitive recursive bound removed.
Lemma 4.3 (PA).
The principle BCP is equivalent to the statement, which I call
Proof. The point is that the definition of boundedness is tailored for exactly this. Clearly BCP implies BCP ′ . For the converse, suppose BCP ′ holds, fix r, n, L, k and let N be large enough to witness BCP ′ . We need to show that already there is a homogeneous sequence of structures all of whose universes are contained in kCol(k, k, n). Let F be a bounded coloring on N and, by BCP ′ let H = A 0 ⊆ ... ⊆ A k−1 be a collection of models so that F is homogeneous on all of its n-tuples and the cardinality of A 0 is less than k. By boundedness, there is a formula ϕ so that H |= * ϕ (thinking of H and an (L, k)-model). Applying the F-collapse to H with respect to this formula (and noting the isomorphism invariance of F ) then gives a new homogeneous sequence for F , this time with all structures as initial segments of kCol(k, k, n) as required. The last point to note is that applying the F -collapse to a given structure can only shrink its cardinality hence the collapsed version of A 0 is also of cardinality less than k.
In a proof very similar to the one for PH we now show that BCP is true in the standard model.
Lemma 4.4. In the standard model BCP
′ is true and hence so is BCP.
Proof. Fix r, n, L, k and suppose that there is no N witnessing BCP ′ . Then for each N we can find a coloring F with no homogeneous subset of small first element. Taking all such F 's ordered by end extension, we obtain a finite branching infinite tree, which has a branch, B. This branch is a coloring of (L, n)-models on ω so by Ramsey's theorem it has an infinite homogeneous sequence. But this sequence intersected with some sufficiently large finite N will give a contradiction exactly the same way as the proof of PH does.
Thus is remains to show that PA+BCP ′ implies con(PA). To this end, fix a formula with one free variable, ϕ(x). I will show that PA+BCP ′ implies that there is a square increasing (L, n)-model of LNP (ϕ). Upping this to finitely many formulae is then as in the proof of PH so as a result we get that PA + BCP implies that all finite subsets Γ ⊆ PA have a model and hence PA is consistent just like in the previous proofs. Thus to finish the proof of Theorem 4.2 I show the following.
Lemma 4.5. If BCP ′ implies that that for all sufficiently large n there is a square increasing (L, n) model of LNP (ϕ).
Proof. Assume BCP ′ . Let k >> n and let n be much larger than the depth of ϕ. If there is an (L, n)-model fulfilling ¬∃xϕ(x) we're done so suppose not. Like in the proof of the Paris-Harrington theorem, fix an m 0 large enough so that all terms in ϕ are defined in M m 0 . For an (L, n)-model A let us denote the least x so that A |= * ϕ(x) as x A . For a square increasing (L, n + 1)-model M m , m = m 1 < ... < m n+1 , we define a coloring F on some sufficiently large N as follows:
. We need to check that this is a coloring. Isomorphism invariance is clear. For boundedness, suppose that we have a square increasing sequence M m 1 ⊆ ... ⊆ M m l of structures of length l ≥ n. By assumption, this sequence fulfills Q ∧ ∃xϕ(x) we can use this formula in the operation from the finite model lemma. Let B be the F-collapse of M m 1 ⊆ ... ⊆ M m l . Suppose now that for some n + 1-tuple of elements from B, say B 0 , ..., B n we have that F ( B 0 , ..., B n ) = 1. This means that the minimal x so that B 0 , B 1 , B 3 , ..., B n |= * ϕ(x) is different from the minimal y so that B 0 , B 2 , B 3 , ..., B n |= * ϕ(y) but by the construction in the finite model lemma, condition 5, this means exactly that the same must have been true of the A's, as needed. Now, by BCP F has has a homogeneous sequence H = A 0 , ..., A k−1 of length k whose first element has cardinality less than k. Moreover the homogeneous set must be colored 0 since |A 0 | ≤ k. But now arguing the same way as in the proof of the Paris-Harrington theorem we get that any n + 1-tuple of elements from H will satisfy LNP (ϕ).
Choice Function Principles
Now I consider two variations of the main result of section 3 of [5] . The first is a strikingly simple Π 0 2 sentence which I call CFP 2 (2 to indicate the quanitfier complexity). The second is a variation which I call CFP 1 and is Π 0 1 . I prove the following chain of implications over PA: PH ⇒ CFP 2 ⇒ CFP 1 ⇒ con(PA). As a consequence it follows that both CFP 2 and CFP 1 are not provable in PA, but both hold in the standard model. To define the statements CFP 2 and CFP 1 I will define a square increasing choice function. Throughout this section we fix a ∆ 1 definable square increasing sequence r of length ω, say r 0 < r 1 < ... < r n < .... For example r 0 = 2 and r i+1 = r 2 i + 1 would work fine. Definition 5.1 (Square Increasing Choice Function). Let n, N be natural numbers.
n or, in words, the set of all n-length sequences of numbers in r less than N. A function F : SI r (n, N) → ω is a square increasing choice function (or just a choice function for short) if for every m ∈ SI(n, N) we have that
Our first principle, which we call CFP 2 (CFP for "Choice Function Principle"), is the statement that for all n and k there is an N so that if f is a square increasing choice function on SI r (n, N) then there is a set H ⊆ r ∩ N so that |H| = k and f ↾ [H] n depends only on the first element.
Lemma 5.2. PH implies CFP 2 .
Proof. Assume PH and fix numbers n and k. Let N be large enough that by PH we have that for any partition P : [N] 2n+1 → 2 there is a homogeneous set of size at least k with first element less than its cardinality. Now let f be a choice function with domain SI r (n, N). We need to find a set H of size k so that f restricted to H depends only on the first element. Define the partition P f on 2n + 1-tuples of elements of elements from r less than N as follows:
where s 0 and s 1 have length n. By PH there is a set H of size at least k which is homogeneous for P f and has cardinality larger than its minimal element. Since |H| is greater than its least element it must be the case that P f ↾ [H] n+1 ≡ 0. But this means that H is as required for f by the definition of the partition. Now we define a version of choice functions for (L, n)-models.
. An (L, n)-choice function is a function F whose domain is a collection of (L, n)-models consisting of square increasing models with associated square increasing sequences contained in r and closed under isomorphism and F-collapses satisfying:
(1) Choice:
Bounded Choice: For each k ≥ n and every ⊆-linearly ordered sequence of length k of partial structures A = A 0 , ..., A k−1 so that all of the sub n-tuples are in the domain of F , there is a formula ϕ of length at most k so that A |= * ϕ and if B = B 0 , ..., B n−1 is the F-collapse of A then for any
If the domain of F is the closure of the set square increasing models under isomorphism and F-Collapses with domain included in some large finite N, then we say that F is a choice function on N.
I now define the second Choice Function Principle I will consider, denoted CFP 1 .
Definition 5.4. The principle CFP 1 is that statement that for all L, n, k, the statement CFP 1 (L, n, k, kCol(k, j, k, |L|, n)+1) holds where, CFP 1 (L, n, k, N) is the statement that if F is an (L, n)-choice function on N, then there is a sequence of partial structures of length k, say A 0 ⊆ A 1 ⊆ ... ⊆ A k−1 so that for any n-tuple A of elements from the sequence, F (A) depends only on the first structure. L, n, k, N) . The proof of this lemma is exactly the same as the proof of Lemma 4.3 using the bounded choice property of choice functions in place of the boundedness property of colorings. Next I show that CFP 2 implies CFP 1 .
Lemma 5.6. CFP 2 implies CFP ′ 1 and hence also CFP 1 . Proof. Fix n, k and L and let N be large enough to witness the conclusion of CFP 2 for n and k. Now fix an (L, n)-choice function F on N. By restricting the domain to the square increasing models with lengths in r F can be viewed as a square increasing choice function. Hence, there is a set H which is homogeneous for it, as needed.
As a corollary of the previous lemmas it follows that Lemma 5.7. PH implies CFP 1 and, in particular CFP 1 is true. Proof. By what has been shown so far, and following the same template as before, to prove Theorem 5.8 it remains to show that if M |= PA + CFP ′ 1 then M |="for all k and all sufficiently large n PA P F k has an (L, n)-model". To show this, fix M |= PA + CFP ′ 1 and work internally in M. Like in the proof of the unprovability of PH we will show how to find an (L, n)-model for a given instance of LNP (ϕ). The general case of finitely many instances is then the same modification. Thus fix a formula ϕ(x), a natural number n and define an (L, n)-choice function F by setting, for square increasing models M m with m consisting of elements of r and m 0 fixed and large enough that M m 0 defines all terms in ϕ, the value F ( M m ) to be the M-least x ∈ M m 1 so that M [1,n−1] |= ϕ(x). Using item 5 on the list from the Finite Model Lemma like in the proof of Lemma 4.5 the bounded choice property holds so F is a choice function. Without loss of generality we may assume that F is always defined since otherwise there is an (L, n)-model which fulfills ¬∃xϕ(x) so we would be done. Now, by CFP ′ 1 let A = A 0 ⊆ ... ⊆ A k−1 be a sequence of models for which F depends only on the first structure where k >> n. Let x 0 ∈ A 0 be F (A 0 , ...), since F depends only on the first structure, this is well defined. As I noted above, the semantics of fulfillment give that if some A |= * ψ and we add a new top element A n then A, A n |= * ψ as well. As a result, for any n-tuple A of elements from A not including A 0 we get that A 0 , A |= * ϕ(x 0 ). Now I show,
The construction of (L, n)-models also works in the context of other foundational theories. For instance, one could run similar arguments in fragments of arithmetic, subsystems of second order arithmetic or various set theories.
Question 4. Can (L, n)-models be used to prove independence or construct models of these theories?
